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2 
 
Stephen R. Cerutti, II 
Joseph J. Terz 
Office of United States Attorney 
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse 
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0000 
Attorneys for Appellee 
 
Tina Schneider 
Suite 201 
44 Exchange Street 
Portland, ME 04101-0000 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
_________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal presents a discrete question arising under the 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 28 U.S.C. § 2465: 
 does CAFRA entitle a convicted criminal to interest on an 
award of excess funds returned to him after he satisfies a 
restitution order?  We hold that it does not. 
I 
 Following his federal criminal convictions for wire fraud 
and failure to appear at trial, the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania ordered Ryan James Craig 
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to pay $12,411 in restitution and a $300 special assessment.1
 Craig appealed the order that the $3,631 be transferred to 
the Rhode Island District Court.  Persuaded by Craig’s appeal, 
we ordered the return of the $3,631 to Craig, holding that “the 
District Court lacked the statutory authority to order the transfer 
of seized funds to the Rhode Island Court for the purpose of 
facilitating the payment of restitution in an unrelated case.”  
United States v. Craig, 359 F. App’x 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2009).  
In accordance with our opinion, the District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania directed that the $3,631 be 
returned to Craig.  Craig then filed a motion seeking interest on 
that amount pursuant to CAFRA.  The District Court denied the 
motion, and this timely appeal followed. 
  
The Government sought to satisfy the restitution order from 
$16,342 it had seized previously from Craig.  Conceding that the 
seized funds could be used for that purpose, Craig filed a motion 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the 
return of the remaining $3,631.  The Government opposed 
Craig’s motion, arguing that the balance should be applied to an 
unsatisfied restitution order entered by the United States District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island.  After the District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the 
Government’s request and denied Craig’s Rule 41(g) motion, 
the Government moved to dismiss the civil forfeiture action it 
had simultaneously been pursuing against Craig. 
 
II 
                                                 
1 We affirmed Craig’s conviction and sentence in 
United States v. Craig, 343 F. App’x 766 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Craig’s criminal case pursuant to § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “It is a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that 
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against the 
United States unless Congress, via a statute, expressly and 
unequivocally waives the United States’ immunity to suit.”  
United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000).  
“‘[W]aivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to be 
effective, must be unequivocally expressed,’ and any such 
waiver must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 
(1992)).  Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s “no-interest rule” 
dictates that, “[i]n the absence of express congressional consent 
to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of 
immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest 
award.”  Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 
(1986), superseded on other grounds by Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114, 105 Stat. 1079. 
A 
 Reprising the arguments he made in the District Court, 
Craig first asserts that the United States is liable for interest 
under CAFRA because he prevailed in his challenge to the 
Government’s attempt to divert funds to satisfy the Rhode Island 
restitution order.2
                                                 
2 As Craig in his opening brief does not suggest that he 
substantially prevailed in the civil forfeiture action itself, we 
deem the argument waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. 
Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d 
  We disagree.  CAFRA provides: “[I]n any 
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civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of 
Federal law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the 
United States shall be liable for . . . interest actually paid to the 
United States . . . and . . . an imputed amount of interest.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1).  A party cannot “prevail” without securing 
an “alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.”  NAACP v. 
N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 486 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 Here, when the District Court directed that the seized 
funds be applied toward the payment of restitution, the 
Government moved to dismiss the forfeiture proceeding it had 
initiated against Craig.  He agreed to the dismissal of the civil 
action, and the District Court granted the Government’s motion. 
 Craig obtained neither a judgment on the merits nor any relief 
specific to the forfeiture action.  Thus, he does not qualify as a 
“substantially prevail[ing]” party under CAFRA.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2465(b)(1). 
 While Craig concedes that “a Rule 41(g) motion for 
return of seized funds may not be a civil proceeding to forfeit 
property,” he suggests that the criminal restitution order issued 
by the District Court at the Government’s request qualifies as a 
civil proceeding to forfeit property.  This argument cannot be 
reconciled with the fact that an order of restitution is a 
component of a criminal sentence, United States v. Perez, 514 
F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2007).  As such, it is a remedy distinct 
from forfeiture and Craig’s attempt to conflate the two for 
purposes of CAFRA fails. 
B 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief.”). 
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 Craig next argues that equity requires the Government to 
disgorge the interest.  Craig cites no authority—nor are we 
aware of any—for the proposition that equity can abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of the United States.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has noted, “neither fairness 
considerations nor rules applicable to private disputes can alone 
provide grounds for abrogating sovereign immunity.”  Larson v. 
United States, 274 F.3d 643, 647 (1st Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, 
we hold that Rule 41(g), which provides only for the “return [of] 
property” and makes no explicit mention of interest, does not 
waive the sovereign’s immunity with respect to Craig’s claim. 
 “Although courts treat a motion pursuant to [Rule 41(g)] 
as a civil equitable action, such a characterization cannot serve 
as the basis for subjecting the United States to all forms of 
equitable relief.”  Bein, 214 F.3d at 415.  In Bein, we held that 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction over a Rule 41(g) motion 
seeking to recover damages for property that the Government 
allegedly destroyed.  Id. at 416.  Noting that the Rule “only 
provides for one express remedy—the return of property,” we 
concluded that “a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that does 
not expressly provide for an award of monetary damages does 
not waive sovereign immunity.”  Id. at 413.  The same logic 
applies to an award of interest.  Accordingly, we reject Craig’s 
attempt to circumvent Bein by characterizing the interest as part 
of the seized property because “the force of the no-interest rule 
cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old 
institution.”  Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321. 
 Our holding accords with the majority of our sister 
circuits to have addressed the issue.  See Larson, 274 F.3d at 
647–48 (“[W]e feel constrained to hold that sovereign immunity 
prevents recovery of interest here . . . [because while] Congress 
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has revised the statute to indicate its wish to waive sovereign 
immunity and allow interest; [it] did not make the revision 
retroactive.”); United States v. 30,006.25 in U.S. Currency, 236 
F.3d 610, 613, 614 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[To the extent that] 
recharacterizing an interest award as a disgorgement of profits 
circumvents the effect of sovereign immunity . . . we [are not] 
aware[] of any general waiver of sovereign immunity for unjust 
enrichment claims.  Moreover, fairness or policy reasons cannot 
by themselves waive sovereign immunity.”); United States v. 
$7,990.00 in U.S. Currency, 170 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“Sovereign immunity does not depend upon whether the 
government benefitted from its conduct in question.  Nor can the 
no-interest rule be dismissed by labeling the award [the 
petitioner] seeks constructive interest, or compensation for his 
loss of use of the property—‘the force of the no-interest rule 
cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old 
institution.’”); Ikelionwu v. United States, 150 F.3d 233, 239 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“Absent ‘express [C]ongressional consent to the 
award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to 
suit, the United States is immune from an interest award.’  There 
is no statutory basis for awarding prejudgment interest in this 
case.  Accordingly . . . [petitioner] will not receive prejudgment 
interest.” (quoting Shaw, 478 U.S. at 314)). 
 We recognize that our approach differs from that 
articulated by the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which 
permit claims of interest to proceed against the United States.  
See Carvajal v. United States, 521 F.3d 1242, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“Considering the text of CAFRA, the overall statutory 
scheme, and the legislative history, we hold that [United States 
v.] $277,000 remains good law.”); United States v. 1461 W. 
42nd St., 251 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
government may be liable for pre-judgment interest to the extent 
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that it has earned interest on the seized res.  In such cases, the 
government must disgorge its earnings along with the property 
at the time when the property is returned.”); United States v. 
$515, 060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3d 491, 504 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]o the extent that the Government has actually or 
constructively earned interest on seized funds, it must disgorge 
those earnings along with the property itself when the time 
arrives for a return of the seized res to its owner.”); United 
States v. $277,000 U.S. Currency, 69 F.3d 1491, 1493 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“[S]hifting from one pocket to another cannot obscure 
the fact that . . . the government obtained tangible and calculable 
financial benefit from the retention of [Claimant]’s money.  This 
is the money that is constructively part of the res, and that must 
be returned to [Claimant].”). 
 As we reasoned in United States v. Nolasco, 354 F. 
App’x 676, 682 (3d Cir. 2009) (non-precedential), the minority 
view articulated by the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits is at 
odds with Shaw’s exhortation that “[c]ourts lack the power to 
award interest against the United States on the basis of what 
they think is or is not sound policy.”  Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321.  
“[The] view expressed in $277,000 in U.S. Currency (finding 
private transactions instructive) and Carvajal (relying on 
CAFRA’s legislative history) is in conflict with Shaw.”  
Nolasco, 354 F. App’x at 682.  “[W]hether labeled as damages, 
loss, earned increment, just compensation, discount, offset, 
penalty or any other term, the no-interest rule remains 
applicable.”  Id.  Because “interest by any other name is still 
interest,” id., Craig’s equity-based claim must fail. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
